Abstract. Communication protocols pose interesting and di cult challenges for veri cation technologies. The state spaces of interesting protocols are either in nite or too large for nite-state veri cation techniques like model checking and state exploration. Theorem proving is also not e ective since the formal correctness proofs of these protocols can be long and complicated. We describe a series of protocol veri cation experiments culminating in a methodology where theorem proving is used to abstract out the sources of unboundedness in the protocol to yield a skeletal protocol that can be veri ed using model checking. Our experiments focus on the Philips bounded retransmission protocol originally studied by Groote and van de Pol and by Helmink, Sellink, and Vaandrager. First, a scaled-down version of the protocol is analyzed using the Mur state exploration tool as a debugging aid and then translated into the PVS speci cation language. The PVS veri cation of the generalized protocol illustrates the di culty of using theorem proving to verify in nite-state protocols. Some of this di culty can be overcome by extracting a nite-state abstraction of the protocol that preserves the property of interest while being amenable to model checking. We compare the performance of Mur , SMV, and the PVS model checkers on this reduced protocol.
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Introduction
Communication protocols are an important class of concurrent algorithms that pose a di cult challenge for existing veri cation technologies 11] . Tools based on model checking and state exploration are e ective and widely used for protocol veri cation, but many real-life protocols are not nite state and cannot be fully analyzed by these methods. In these instances, veri cation techniques based on theorem proving can be applied, but these have the disadvantage that they are not automatic and the veri cation e ort involved can be substantial. In this paper, we examine the relative e cacy of nite-state and theorem proving approaches to veri cation when applied to a non-academic example of a communication protocol. We show how it is possible to combine the two techniques to create a useful methodology for protocol veri cation.
The speci c protocol we examine is the bounded retransmission protocol (BRP) from Philips 10, 9] . This variant of the alternating bit protocol transmits les consisting of a sequence of individual messages. File transmission is aborted if any message in the le remains unacknowledged after a xed number of retransmissions. This protocol has already been veri ed by researchers at Philips and CWI using the Coq proof checker 5] using the framework of Lynch and Tuttle's I/O automata 16]. Their hand proof e ort occupied two man-months, and it took them three man-months to mechanize this proof using Coq. This proof has also been formalized in a process algebra called CRL and checked using Coq 9] . This proof also required a serious amount of e ort.
The interesting question therefore is whether this veri cation e ort can be dramatically reduced, perhaps by using a combination of nite state and theorem proving techniques. To explore this question, we rst consider a scaled-down version of the protocol BRP-M and show that it can be quickly analyzed and debugged using the Murphi state exploration tool from Stanford University. This Murphi speci cation can be converted into PVS 20] using a mechanical translator. The PVS description of the protocol is then generalized to the full protocol BRP-PVS, and the main safety property of the protocol is proved in a conventional manner as an invariant. Our initial PVS proof attempt of BRP-PVS took about three months to develop and verify, and this is roughly similar to the Philips/CWI e ort. By employing a more nely tuned proof methodology and by taking further advantage of the automation provided by PVS, the veri cation has been redone in about one man-month.
Since this level of e ort is still very large, we investigate techniques for reducing the veri cation e ort without compromising the generality of the protocol. The PVS theorem prover has recently been extended with mu-calculus based model checking 21] so it is natural to ask whether model checking can somehow be applied to BRP-PVS. We answer this question in the a rmative by using theorem proving to construct a property-preserving nite-state abstraction BRP-mu that can be veri ed using model checking. There are three sources of unboundedness in the state space of the protocol: the message data, the retransmission bound, and the le length. Each of these sources of unboundedness can be eliminated by means of abstraction. The correspondence between BRP-PVS and BRP-mu is veri ed using PVS. The resulting nite-state protocol BRP-mu can be veri ed using a model checking or state exploration tool. We have successfully applied and can compare the PVS model checker 12], Murphi 18] , and SMV 17] on this example. The PVS proof of the abstraction mapping takes two man-weeks. The model checking part is largely automatic, but our initial attempts with the PVS model checker were unsuccessful until the mu-calculus de nition of invariance was revised to compute xpoints di erently.
The general lesson from this is that the correctness of communication protocols is primarily control-sensitive, and the most e ective veri cation approach is to use theorem proving to abstract out the control skeleton which can then be veri ed by nite-state techniques. We believe that the above veri cation paradigm can be generalized to apply to other protocols of industrial relevance. The main contribution of the paper is a mechanized methodology for industrialstrength protocol veri cation where:
1. A scaled-down version of the protocol is debugged using state exploration 2. This scaled-down version is generalized to recover the full version of the protocol for veri cation using theorem proving 3. Theorem proving is used to abstract out a nite-state protocol whose correctness (when established by model checking) implies the correctness of original protocol. The work reported here is very much in progress. The e ort saved by combining theorem proving and model checking is still quite modest at this point, but we believe that such savings can indeed be achieved through a more aggressive application of our proposed methodology.
The main di erence between our work and previous work is that we develop a mechanized veri cation methodology for communication protocols where theorem proving is used to compute nite abstractions that can be veri ed by model checking. The closest related work is obviously the earlier veri cation of Helmink, Sellink, and Vaandrager 10] . The bulk of their veri cation is in proving various invariance properties but their main result is a re nement argument showing that one I/O automaton speci cation implements another more abstract one. We have employed a formalization that is closer to the state-transition model of Unity 3] and TLA 14] . By superposing the abstract and concrete state machines, we reduce the re nement demonstration to that of invariance. While the manual e ort required by both their proof and by our initial proof attempt with BRP-PVS is comparable, PVS seems to provide greater and more e cient automation in the veri cation process particularly through the use of highly optimized rewriting and BDDs 6]. Our use of the abstracted protocol BRP-mu yields a considerable simpli cation in the proof and a valuable technique for other protocol correctness proofs.
Groote and van de Pol have given a notationally compact speci cation and proof of this protocol using the process algebra CRL 9] . They have also formalized and veri ed this proof using the Coq proof checker by rst formalizing the process algebra. The resulting Coq description is fairly large and their verication is not mechanized to the degree achieved in PVS. 
The Bounded Retransmission Protocol
The bounded retransmission protocol developed at Philips Research Laboratory communicates messages from a producer to a consumer over an unreliable physical medium that can lose messages. The protocol is a nontrivial extension of the alternating bit protocol 1] that uses timeouts and aborts transmission following a bounded number of retransmission attempts. The environment to the protocol consists of the producer and the consumer. The black box view of the system is that it accepts requests REQ(f) from the producer to transmit the le f. When transmission of a le has been either completed or aborted, the producer receives The protocol consists of a sender program at the producer side; a receiver program at the consumer side, and two channels (one-place bu ers): a message channel K, and an acknowledgment channel L. Both channels are unreliable in that they can lose messages or acknowledgments. The protocol is pictured in Figure 1 . The sender sends each message over the channel K and then waits for an acknowledgment on channel L. If there is no acknowledgment, the sender times out and retransmits the message. There is a xed upper bound on the number of such retransmissions. The protocol uses three timers to deal with loss of messages and acknowledgments. A timer has a xed period T of time associated. When it is set, a timeout occurs T time units or more later. The rst timer in the sender is used to detect the loss of a message or an acknowledgement. It is used as follows: when the sender sends a new message over K, timer 1 is set. The time associated with this timer exceeds the time it takes from when a message has been sent over K until the corresponding acknowledgment is received over L. If an acknowledgment comes back within this time, the timer is cleared (and the next message is sent). If not, a timeout occurs whereupon the message is retransmitted, and the timer is set again. When the retransmission bound has been reached, the sender aborts transmission and con rms that the transmission failed. Either it con rms CONF(NOT OK) or it con rms CONF(DONT KNOW). Two other timers are used to bring the sender and the receiver back in synchrony after a le transmission has been aborted by the sender. We do not model the real-time aspects of the protocol but instead represent the timers by timer events. For example, the timeout event which is supposed to detect message loss is instead de ned to occur when a message is lost. This simpli cation is also present in Helmink, et al 10].
The receiver may also retransmit acknowledgments. This happens when the receiver gets a message that it has already received once. The receiver distinguishes between an old message and a new message via the alternating bit (the toggle) which is part of the message.
We can now examine the behavior of the protocol for the case when no messages or acknowedgments are lost. The sender sends each individual message in the le to the receiver over the channel K in the form One complication in the protocol is that upon abortion of a le transmission, the sender and the receiver must regain synchrony for the next le transmission. If the retransmission bound for a message has been reached without an acknowledgment, then the le transmission is aborted. The sender must then delay for a su ciently long interval before transmitting the next le so that the receiver's timer can time out and the receiver can hence determine that le transmission has been aborted. Another complication is that when le transmission is aborted, then it is possible that the next message on channel K (namely, the rst message of a new le) may not have its alternating bit properly toggled. This is because the receiver may have received the earlier message but the sender did not receive an acknowledgment. To cope with this loss of synchronization, the receiver resets its toggle bit to that of the rst message and uses the bit alternation for subsequent messages in the same le.
State Exploration Using Murphi
In this section we present the formulation of the protocol and its correctness criteria in Murphi 18], a state exploration tool for nite state transition systems. Murphi uses a program model that is similar to Unity 3] . A Murphi program has three components: a declaration of the global variables, a description of the initial state, and a collection of transition rules. Each transition rule is a guarded command that consists of a boolean guard expression over the global variables, and a deterministic statement that changes the global variables. Transition rules can include assert statements that terminate execution when the asserted condition is falsi ed. We use Murphi as an e ective debugging tool for testing invariance assertions.
An execution of a Murphi program is obtained by repeatedly (1) arbitrarily selecting one of the transition rules where the boolean guard is true in the current state; (2) executing the statement of the chosen transition rule. The statement is executed atomically: no other transition rules are executed in parallel. Thus state transitions are interleaving and processes communicate via shared variables. The notion of process is not formally supported, but may be thought of as a subset of the transition rules. The Murphi veri er tries to explore all reachable states in order to ensure that all assert statements hold. If a violation is detected, Murphi generates a violating trace.
Programming the Protocol. The protocol we have described in the previous section takes three parameters: the kind of data transmitted, the size of les (how many messages in each le), and nally the number of retransmissions (max) performed by the sender before it aborts le transmission. It turns out that when we choose the data domain to be nite, bound the size of les, and choose some xed value for max, then the protocol state space is bounded and it can be formulated and veri ed in Mur . We therefore choose the data domain to be boolean, x the size of les at 3, and set the retransmission limit to 2: When the sender sends a message, it just writes to K, and when the receiver reads this message it just reads K. The ag K full is raised when some message has been written to K, i.e., the sender sets it to true when writing to K, and the receiver sets it to false when reading from K. Similar ags are used for other variables that play the role of \channels." The sender control is managed via a sender program counter spc of type Spc: The rule is named read req. The precondition requires that the sender's program counter is WR: \wait for a request". Also, the req full ag must be true { the environment must have written some le into req. The head is set to point to the rst message in the new le, and the program counter is set to SF: \send the le." The verify REQ procedure contains part of the abstract speci cation of the protocol. The call will verify certain assertions in the abstract protocol, and if they fail to hold, program execution will terminate. The abstract protocol thus \polices" the behavior of the protocol; this will be explained in the next section. Note that the \policing" only takes place for so called external transition rules: the ones that model externally visible events according to the black box view. Communications on channels K and L are, for example, not external.
There are other sender rules, and there are similar rules for the receiver, seventeen in total. The entire protocol makes 340 lines of code covering above 11 pages.
The Correctness Criteria. The abstract protocol speci cation is written as part of the Murphi-program and uses its own local types and variables. For example, the following three variables are declared:
Var abusy : boolean; afile : File; ahead : 1..last+1;
The abusy variable is true whenever a le is being transmitted. The variables afile and ahead will together at any time model which message the abstract protocol is prepared to transmit (by an IND action). Now we are ready to de ne the abstract protocol. We do this in terms of a collection of procedures, one for each of the four external activities of the protocol: REQ, IND, IND ERR, and CONF. For example, we saw previously the call verify REQ(req). This procedure is de ned as follows: So these procedures are supposed to model the same external behavior as the protocol, ignoring channels K and L. Note how the assert statements function as \pre-conditions": when the protocol calls the procedure, the assert condition is evaluated, and if it evaluates to false, the Murphi veri cation terminates, printing the trace of states that lead to the falsi ed assertion. In the above case, abusy must be false. When we veri ed the protocol, no such error states occurred: the downscaled protocol was veri ed \correct" in 784 seconds on a Sparc-20.
Theorem Proving: Proving Safety with PVS
In the previous section, we veri ed a scaled down nite-state version of the protocol using Murphi. The advantage of the veri cation was that it was automatic. In this section, we shall describe the use of PVS to construct a full-scale proof for the complete in nite state protocol. In order to obtain an in nite state protocol in PVS we apply a Mur -to-PVS translator. That is, we apply this translator to the Mur -program in the previous section, and get a corresponding PVS speci cation. This is still a nite-state speci cation and to obtain the in nite state speci cation, we manually modify a few of the PVS declarations.
Applying the translator to the Murphi program yields two PVS theories. The rst one (protocol) contains the protocol itself. The second theory (protocol safe) contains the statement of the correctness criteria. This correctness criteria was implicit in the Murphi program: whenever an assert evaluated to false, the veri er would terminate. We have to nd a way of modeling this in the PVS-speci cation.
The Protocol. The Protocol (obtained by the translation, and some modi cation) is represented as a theory in PVS, a portion of which is shown below. The theory contains de nitions of constants, types, functions, relations, etc. We have modi ed the rst three declarations (i.e., last, max, and Data) in order to get an ini nite state protocol. The Murphi state is modeled as a record. The additional state component SAFE captures the e ect of an assert command. It is initially TRUE, and can only be a ected by the assert commands in the abstract speci cation which checks the externally observable behaviour of the protocol.
We rst look at the PVS de nition of the abstract speci cation. Murphi transitions are translated into PVS as functions over state. The abstract speci cation is de ned as a function which takes an input state and the external action and returns an output state which is the same as the input state except that the abstract state variables may have changed and the SAFE The Correctness Criteria in PVS. We mentioned earlier that the Murphito-PVS translator generates two theories: protocol above, and the theory protocol safe containing the correctness criteria to be proved. The theory de nes two predicates and a theorem: the correctness criteria. The Correctness Proof. The statement we wish to prove is the invariant safe in formula correct, but obviously this invariant needs to be greatly strengthened in order to be provable. Since we cannot anticipate this strengthening, we state the invariant as safe & Delta where Delta represents the yet unknown strengthening. During the course of the proof, Delta is elaborated as a conjunction of auxiliary invariants needed to establish the main invariant.
58 invariants were needed in the proof. All the auxiliary invariant were discovered by the above methodology. This methodology was in fact applied in the second proof attempt. When combined with several other proof optimizations it led to a signi cant reduction in e ort. In comparison with the work of Helmink, et al 10], the invariants used are roughly the same but their invariants were discovered by hand in advance of a mechanical proof, whereas we used the PVS proof to guide the discovery of invariants. Rerunning the proof takes 5 hours.
The veri cation of the protocol has been automated as far as possible by de ning a set of tactics (occupying ve pages). This level of automation could be achieved primarily because of the exibility a orded by the PVS decision procedures.
Abstraction: Reduction to Finite State Using PVS
In recent work 21] a Boolean mu-calculus model checker 12] has been integrated into PVS as a decision procedure. This integration uses a relational mucalculus (quanti ed Boolean formulas with least and greatest xpoints of monotone Boolean predicate transformers) as a medium for communicating between PVS and the model checker for the Boolean mu-calculus. In this section we shall see how to apply this integration to our protocol.
The mu-calculus of a given state type can be formalized within the higherorder logic by de ning least and greatest xpoint operators for monotone predicate transformders. More usefully, the temporal operators of the branching time logic CTL can be de ned using this mu-calculus. In particular, we can de ne the CTL AG operator which represents the modality: \for every path, and for every state along that path" of CTL. The assertion AG(i,n)(p), where i is the initialization predicate and n is the next-state relation, holds if p holds in all reachable states, the latter notion de ned in terms of the least xpoint operator mu.
When the state type is nite, i.e., constructed inductively from the booleans and scalar types using records, tuples, or arrays over subranges, the PVS mucalculus (and the corresponding CTL) can be translated into the Boolean mucalculus and model checking can be used as a decision procedure for this fragment, using just boolean variables and BDDs. The PVS proof command model-check carries out these veri cation steps automatically. The resulting model checker by itself has few advantages over a conventional model checker. The main advantage is when it is combined with theorem proving to exploit the use of abstraction to reduce unbounded state spaces to nite ones. Abstraction is well studied in the literature 4, 7, 15], but the reasoning is usually carried out informally.
In order to prove an AG property, there is a simple way to de ne an abstraction, as shown We then show that the abstract system satis es the abstract property, and that the mapping preserves the initialization predicate, the next-state relation and the property. This is expressed by the following theorem which has been proved using PVS: We saw that there were three sources of unboundedness in BRP: the le size, the message data, and the retransmission bound. These can be abstracted away to obtain a property-preserving abstraction. The main trick is that since we are dealing with ACTL properties, i.e., those that involve only universal path quanti cation, it is okay to introduce additional nondeterminism at the abstract level. In particular, the size of the as yet untransmitted portion of the le can be abstracted to one of NONE, ONE, or MANY, the message data is irrelevant and can be eliminated, and the retransmission bound can be replaced by a nondeterministic choice between the continuation and termination of retransmission. As a result, the type Data is removed. A le is no longer an array of Data but an element of the enumerated type fNONE,ONE,MANYg, indicating whether the le has no elements, one element or more than one element. The constant max is removed: there is no longer an upper bound for the number of retransmissions. This is possible since we just require that whenever the concrete protocol can make a transition, the abstract protocol must also be able to, and surely, if we remove the upper bound, then this is guaranteed. The counter rn itself that counts the number of retransmissions is turned into a single boolean: it is true only if a message has been sent at least once. The le component (afile) in the automaton is just a boolean, indicating whether it is empty or not: whether there is more to send or not. The automaton speci cation also changes but this is acceptable since Theorem 1 admits an abstract property p a distinct from the concrete property p c .
We omit the details of this new automaton speci cation.
In the abstract version of the transition rule Rule write K, for example, the update of K(last) has been changed from K(last) := (head(st)=last) to K(last) := (file(st)=ONE). The update of rn has changed, and the update of K(data) has now disappeared.
The abstraction mapping between the concrete state type and the abstract state type is then given by the function abs de ned below. Recall that Theorem 1 was de ned in the context of a concrete system S c (protocol in our case), an abstract system S a (abstract protocol) and an abstraction mapping h (abs) between the two. Theorem 1 tells us that it is su cient to prove the following propositions corresponding to items 1{4 in the theorem. The rst, third and fourth of these are easily proved by the grind proof strategy of PVS. The second proof obligation is the only nontrivial one and it is shown below as transition preserves. The proof obligation transition preserves only requires the abstract system to simulate a step of the concrete system when a concrete invariant I holds of the initial and nal states of the transition. Indeed, we do require the use of a speci c concrete invariant in justifying the abstraction, and this is currently proved directly in PVS without the aid of abstraction. We, in fact, reuse this invariant from the proof of BRP-PVS in the Section 4.
It took two weeks to de ne the abstract protocol and the abstraction mapping, and to carry out the proof of the main lemma: transition preserves. It takes two hours to rerun the proof of this lemma. However, this lemma again uses a number of invariants about the concrete protocol; we need 45 of the 58 invariants invented in the original invariant proof in Section 4. Considering the extra two-week e ort in carrying out this abstraction proof, one may conclude that no essential work e ort has been saved by doing the abstraction with model checking in comparison with the pure invariant proof. We claim, however, that the abstraction gives a good intuition about the functioning of the protocol, since it focuses on control. Also, it is likely that many of the prior invariance proofs can also be proved via abstraction and model checking.
The nal proof obligation abstract correct is proved by means of model checking. Using the PVS command model-check, this lemma is proved in 36.7 minutes. Our initial experiences in applying the PVS model checker to this example were not satisfactory. This led us to reformulate the abstract protocol in Murphi and in the CTL model checker SMV, in order to compare execution times. In Mur , the veri cation took 28.51 seconds. The main source of e ciency in Murphi with respect to this example is that it uses an explicit (not symbolic) representation of the state space and only explores the reachable states. Our initial de nition of the AG operator was such that it explored all those states that could potentially lead to a state violating the invariant in order to check if these states included the start state. Obviously, many more states were explored in this manner.
When we apply the SMV model checker 17] to the example, it takes 2.5 hours to verify the abstract protocol. When SMV is used with the option`-f', only the`forward' reachable states are examined, and this gives an impressive improvement in e ciency taking only 24 seconds | an improvement factor of nearly 400.
Observations
As a general remark, we want to stress a basic result of the work: to provide a nontrivial example/methodology for reasoning about protocols using theorem proving and model checking. Our framework is adequate for deeper studies of the problems we have encountered, such as the identi cation of suitable invariants and the design of useful nite-state abstractions.
We have found it useful and productive to employ a state exploration tool such as Murphi as a prelude to full theorem proving. Murphi was also useful for checking putative invariants.
In 10] a re nement between the protocol and an abstract protocol was dened and veri ed. Our contribution has been to reformulate re nement as a safety property by superposing the implementation and speci cation of the protocol. This technique seems simple and yet useful.
The in nite state PVS speci cation initially took three man-months to verify. This is comparable to the work in Coq 10] where they were starting from a hand-written proof. We believe though that our proof is more automated than the Coq proof: for any invariant proof, once we had identi ed (and included as assumptions) which other sub-invariants it depended on, the proof was automatic using a specially designed tactic based on decision procedures. With our improved approach of strengthening invariants on the y, we were able to reduce the proof e ort to less than four weeks.
Our use of abstraction yields a better understanding of the protocol since it extracts out the relevant control skeleton. We hope that a deeper study will reveal systematic techniques for obtaining such abstractions.
A Speci cation Automaton In Murphi
Note that the type File and the bound last are de ned in the implementation automaton below. 
